| 1 | -- Prosody IM |
| 2 | -- Copyright (C) 2010 Matthew Wild |
| 3 | -- Copyright (C) 2010 Paul Aurich |
| 4 | -- |
| 5 | -- This project is MIT/X11 licensed. Please see the |
| 6 | -- COPYING file in the source package for more information. |
| 7 | -- |
| 8 | |
| 9 | -- TODO: I feel a fair amount of this logic should be integrated into Luasec, |
| 10 | -- so that everyone isn't re-inventing the wheel. Dependencies on |
| 11 | -- IDN libraries complicate that. |
| 12 | |
| 13 | |
| 14 | -- [TLS-CERTS] - http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-saintandre-tls-server-id-check-10 |
| 15 | -- [XMPP-CORE] - http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-xmpp-3920bis-18 |
| 16 | -- [SRV-ID] - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4985 |
| 17 | -- [IDNA] - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5890 |
| 18 | -- [LDAP] - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4519 |
| 19 | -- [PKIX] - http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280 |
| 20 | |
| 21 | local nameprep = require "util.encodings".stringprep.nameprep; |
| 22 | local idna_to_ascii = require "util.encodings".idna.to_ascii; |
| 23 | local log = require "util.logger".init("x509"); |
| 24 | |
| 25 | module "x509" |
| 26 | |
| 27 | local oid_commonname = "2.5.4.3"; -- [LDAP] 2.3 |
| 28 | local oid_subjectaltname = "2.5.29.17"; -- [PKIX] 4.2.1.6 |
| 29 | local oid_xmppaddr = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.5"; -- [XMPP-CORE] |
| 30 | local oid_dnssrv = "1.3.6.1.5.5.7.8.7"; -- [SRV-ID] |
| 31 | |
| 32 | -- Compare a hostname (possibly international) with asserted names |
| 33 | -- extracted from a certificate. |
| 34 | -- This function follows the rules laid out in |
| 35 | -- sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 of [TLS-CERTS] |
| 36 | -- |
| 37 | -- A wildcard ("*") all by itself is allowed only as the left-most label |
| 38 | local function compare_dnsname(host, asserted_names) |
| 39 | -- TODO: Sufficient normalization? Review relevant specs. |
| 40 | local norm_host = idna_to_ascii(host) |
| 41 | if norm_host == nil then |
| 42 | log("info", "Host %s failed IDNA ToASCII operation", host) |
| 43 | return false |
| 44 | end |
| 45 | |
| 46 | norm_host = norm_host:lower() |
| 47 | |
| 48 | local host_chopped = norm_host:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") -- everything after the first label |
| 49 | |
| 50 | for i=1,#asserted_names do |
| 51 | local name = asserted_names[i] |
| 52 | if norm_host == name:lower() then |
| 53 | log("debug", "Cert dNSName %s matched hostname", name); |
| 54 | return true |
| 55 | end |
| 56 | |
| 57 | -- Allow the left most label to be a "*" |
| 58 | if name:match("^%*%.") then |
| 59 | local rest_name = name:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") |
| 60 | if host_chopped == rest_name:lower() then |
| 61 | log("debug", "Cert dNSName %s matched hostname", name); |
| 62 | return true |
| 63 | end |
| 64 | end |
| 65 | end |
| 66 | |
| 67 | return false |
| 68 | end |
| 69 | |
| 70 | -- Compare an XMPP domain name with the asserted id-on-xmppAddr |
| 71 | -- identities extracted from a certificate. Both are UTF8 strings. |
| 72 | -- |
| 73 | -- Per [XMPP-CORE], matches against asserted identities don't include |
| 74 | -- wildcards, so we just do a normalize on both and then a string comparison |
| 75 | -- |
| 76 | -- TODO: Support for full JIDs? |
| 77 | local function compare_xmppaddr(host, asserted_names) |
| 78 | local norm_host = nameprep(host) |
| 79 | |
| 80 | for i=1,#asserted_names do |
| 81 | local name = asserted_names[i] |
| 82 | |
| 83 | -- We only want to match against bare domains right now, not |
| 84 | -- those crazy full-er JIDs. |
| 85 | if name:match("[@/]") then |
| 86 | log("debug", "Ignoring xmppAddr %s because it's not a bare domain", name) |
| 87 | else |
| 88 | local norm_name = nameprep(name) |
| 89 | if norm_name == nil then |
| 90 | log("info", "Ignoring xmppAddr %s, failed nameprep!", name) |
| 91 | else |
| 92 | if norm_host == norm_name then |
| 93 | log("debug", "Cert xmppAddr %s matched hostname", name) |
| 94 | return true |
| 95 | end |
| 96 | end |
| 97 | end |
| 98 | end |
| 99 | |
| 100 | return false |
| 101 | end |
| 102 | |
| 103 | -- Compare a host + service against the asserted id-on-dnsSRV (SRV-ID) |
| 104 | -- identities extracted from a certificate. |
| 105 | -- |
| 106 | -- Per [SRV-ID], the asserted identities will be encoded in ASCII via ToASCII. |
| 107 | -- Comparison is done case-insensitively, and a wildcard ("*") all by itself |
| 108 | -- is allowed only as the left-most non-service label. |
| 109 | local function compare_srvname(host, service, asserted_names) |
| 110 | local norm_host = idna_to_ascii(host) |
| 111 | if norm_host == nil then |
| 112 | log("info", "Host %s failed IDNA ToASCII operation", host); |
| 113 | return false |
| 114 | end |
| 115 | |
| 116 | -- Service names start with a "_" |
| 117 | if service:match("^_") == nil then service = "_"..service end |
| 118 | |
| 119 | norm_host = norm_host:lower(); |
| 120 | local host_chopped = norm_host:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") -- everything after the first label |
| 121 | |
| 122 | for i=1,#asserted_names do |
| 123 | local asserted_service, name = asserted_names[i]:match("^(_[^.]+)%.(.*)"); |
| 124 | if service == asserted_service then |
| 125 | if norm_host == name:lower() then |
| 126 | log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name); |
| 127 | return true; |
| 128 | end |
| 129 | |
| 130 | -- Allow the left most label to be a "*" |
| 131 | if name:match("^%*%.") then |
| 132 | local rest_name = name:gsub("^[^.]+%.", "") |
| 133 | if host_chopped == rest_name:lower() then |
| 134 | log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name) |
| 135 | return true |
| 136 | end |
| 137 | end |
| 138 | if norm_host == name:lower() then |
| 139 | log("debug", "Cert SRVName %s matched hostname", name); |
| 140 | return true |
| 141 | end |
| 142 | end |
| 143 | end |
| 144 | |
| 145 | return false |
| 146 | end |
| 147 | |
| 148 | function verify_identity(host, service, cert) |
| 149 | local ext = cert:extensions() |
| 150 | if ext[oid_subjectaltname] then |
| 151 | local sans = ext[oid_subjectaltname]; |
| 152 | |
| 153 | -- Per [TLS-CERTS] 4.3, 4.4.4, "a client MUST NOT seek a match for a |
| 154 | -- reference identifier if the presented identifiers include a DNS-ID |
| 155 | -- SRV-ID, URI-ID, or any application-specific identifier types" |
| 156 | local had_supported_altnames = false |
| 157 | |
| 158 | if sans[oid_xmppaddr] then |
| 159 | had_supported_altnames = true |
| 160 | if compare_xmppaddr(host, sans[oid_xmppaddr]) then return true end |
| 161 | end |
| 162 | |
| 163 | if sans[oid_dnssrv] then |
| 164 | had_supported_altnames = true |
| 165 | -- Only check srvNames if the caller specified a service |
| 166 | if service and compare_srvname(host, service, sans[oid_dnssrv]) then return true end |
| 167 | end |
| 168 | |
| 169 | if sans["dNSName"] then |
| 170 | had_supported_altnames = true |
| 171 | if compare_dnsname(host, sans["dNSName"]) then return true end |
| 172 | end |
| 173 | |
| 174 | -- We don't need URIs, but [TLS-CERTS] is clear. |
| 175 | if sans["uniformResourceIdentifier"] then |
| 176 | had_supported_altnames = true |
| 177 | end |
| 178 | |
| 179 | if had_supported_altnames then return false end |
| 180 | end |
| 181 | |
| 182 | -- Extract a common name from the certificate, and check it as if it were |
| 183 | -- a dNSName subjectAltName (wildcards may apply for, and receive, |
| 184 | -- cat treats) |
| 185 | -- |
| 186 | -- Per [TLS-CERTS] 1.5, a CN-ID is the Common Name from a cert subject |
| 187 | -- which has one and only one Common Name |
| 188 | local subject = cert:subject() |
| 189 | local cn = nil |
| 190 | for i=1,#subject do |
| 191 | local dn = subject[i] |
| 192 | if dn["oid"] == oid_commonname then |
| 193 | if cn then |
| 194 | log("info", "Certificate has multiple common names") |
| 195 | return false |
| 196 | end |
| 197 | |
| 198 | cn = dn["value"]; |
| 199 | end |
| 200 | end |
| 201 | |
| 202 | if cn then |
| 203 | -- Per [TLS-CERTS] 4.4.4, follow the comparison rules for dNSName SANs. |
| 204 | return compare_dnsname(host, { cn }) |
| 205 | end |
| 206 | |
| 207 | -- If all else fails, well, why should we be any different? |
| 208 | return false |
| 209 | end |
| 210 | |
| 211 | return _M; |